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What can we do you for? – Naïve Conceptions of the Value of Indigenous 
Cultures and Communities 
 
by Nigel Stobbs 
 
The thesis of this article is that in a liberal democracy we create laws to protect things 
of value.  The strongest legal protection is given to those things which we believe are 
fundamentally or intrinsically valuable.  Although there is an increasing body of law 
aimed at protecting the rights of Indigenous peoples and communities, this body of 
law (in most instances) does not appear to be based on a belief that there is true 
intrinsic value in these entities.  Furthermore, the suggestion is made that a deeper 
concept of intrinsic value, which does not solely depend on the attitudes or beliefs of 
the wider community, should play a role in the formation of credible law and policy in 
relation to Indigenous communities.   
 
The preamble to the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples1 provides that signatory nations will affirm that: 
All peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of civilisations and cultures, 
which constitute the common heritage of humankind. 
 
There is no doubt that Indigenous cultures and communities do tend to make the 
global collection of civilisations more diverse, however this statement betrays what I 
submit is a shallow and potentially marginalising view of the value of Indigenous 
cultures.  The statement typifies legislative, political and academic views of 
Indigeneity which predicate value upon the attitude and beliefs of a valuer.  In fact, 
most international and Australian law and public policy which purportedly seeks to 
protect Indigenous Australians is based, in my view, on a belief that the value of 
Indigenous culture is fundamentally instrumental.  In other words, we ought to respect 
and protect Indigenous peoples because we value them for what we perceive them as 
contributing (in either a political, economic or cultural sense), and not on the basis of 
any intrinsic value or on the basis of how such peoples value themselves and their 
communities. 
 
At a deeper level, I suspect that a failure to acknowledge any fundamental intrinsic 
value of Indigenous cultures is at the heart of the long running dispute between 
Indigenous people and various states over the extent of any right to self-determination 
and self-government2.  
 
To hold that Indigenous communities have instrumental value is to assert that they are 
valuable because they create or lead to outcomes which are of some use or benefit to 
the wider community.  The preamble from the Draft Declaration, for example, 
impliedly asserts that a diversity of world cultures is beneficial and valuable to the 
global community.  This is undoubtedly true. A diverse global community implies a 
diversity of views, knowledge and experiences which can benefit a range of global 
concerns such as environmental protection and economic policy.  Biodiversity 
strategies and programs, for instance, continue to draw extensively on traditional land 
and resource management practices of Indigenous communities in Australia.3 
 
 
 
At a popular level we can identify many benefits which derive from the content of 
Indigenous cultures and the phenomenon of cultural diversity.  Traditional medicines, 
agricultural practices and the outputs of Indigenous performers and artists are all of 
national and international significance. 
 
To hold that Indigenous cultures and communities have intrinsic value is to claim 
(ideally) that they have value, and hence a right to exist and flourish, regardless of the 
beliefs or attitudes of external individuals, organisations or governments.  Laws and 
policies based on a recognition of the intrinsic value of Indigenous communities 
would recognise that these communities are worth protecting not as a means to some 
other end but as either ends in themselves or as entities which are self-valuing.  Surely 
genuine self-determination is owed to a discrete entity which has the capacity to value 
itself. 
 
To claim that Indigenous cultures have intrinsic value is not to deny their instrumental 
value, or to deny that their instrumental value is something we ought to recognise and 
promote.  What we should deny is that this instrumental value ought to be what 
fundamentally or overwhelmingly informs our legal and policy approaches to 
Indigenous issues.   
 
Legislation and policy based on a recognition of intrinsic value would need to be 
stimulated by a wider academic and social debate on what it means for a cultural 
group to have such value.  There are a number of possible formulations of this 
concept – some of which we would want to avoid.   
 
One possible conception of a culture which has intrinsic value is that it is one which 
we value for its own sake – regardless of any material or social benefit with which it 
provides us (the wider community).  Something akin to this conception underpins the 
limited recognition given to Indigenous customary law in Australia by some elements 
of the judiciary and by institutions such as the Australian Law Reform Commission4.  
The Commission’s recommendation that consideration be given to recognition of 
traditional marriages in order to provide better access to justice for surviving spouses 
and the children of such unions seems to be based on an assumption that traditional 
marriages5 are the product of a legitimate and intrinsically valuable culture. There is 
no mention made in the Commission’s report of the value of cultural diversity or 
instrumental benefits to the wider community in the recognition of customary law. 
 
Tempting though it might be to adopt such a formulation of intrinsic cultural value, I 
would submit that this is a somewhat inadequate position since it predicates the value 
of the culture on the attitudes of  people external to it.  While there are many in the 
Australian community who may value Indigenous Australian cultures ‘simply for 
what they are’ and would protect them on that basis, would we want to link the 
continued legislative protection of these cultures to the preferences and attitudes of 
the non-Indigenous majority?  To some extent that might be an inescapable practical 
reality in a liberal democracy, but more fundamental legal instruments such as 
international conventions and any potential Australian Bill of Rights could be based 
on a deeper notion of intrinsic cultural value. 
 
 
Another, related, conception of intrinsic cultural value could be that it consists of 
value which we ascribe to a culture based on some property which is intrinsic or 
inherent to it.  This is the sort of intrinsic value which often informs environmental 
protection law.  Many plants, animals and ecosystems are valued, and thereby 
afforded formal legal protection, as a result of their rarity.  Endangered species are 
very strictly monitored and interaction with them is highly regulated in many 
jurisdictions – and often the species protected has no obvious instrumental value and 
is protected for no other reason than its rarity.6  Could we then argue by analogy that 
we have an obligation to protect Indigenous cultures on the basis of their rarity and 
vulnerability – and that this conception of intrinsic value ought to inform our law and 
policy making?  To some extent it could be argued that such a naïve Social Darwinist 
approach to legislating and policy making for Indigenous affairs in Australia has been 
characterised by some analogous concern for rarity. 
 
Apart from the obvious criticism that we would not want to take some sort of cold, 
mechanistic, flora and fauna view of Indigenous cultures, predicating value on rarity 
is still to predicate the worth of a culture on external conditions.7  The rarity of a thing 
is a measure of the non-existence of related or similar things.  So too is diversity.  So 
although it is possible to value something based on rarity, and to discount or ignore 
any instrumental benefits received from it, rarity is not truly intrinsic.  Recognition of 
the vulnerability and fragmentation of  Indigenous cultures and communities as a 
result of colonial and social oppression is clearly warranted and has a place in the 
theoretical and political context which informs good law, but it is not enough. 
 
The key deficiency with all the conceptions of value with which we have so far 
approached the task of making laws and policies for the benefit of Indigenous cultures 
is that they are all contingent upon the existence of particular values, preferences or 
attitudes of people external to the culture in question.  Preferences, values and 
attitudes are often fickle things and subject to change in response to political, 
economic and social circumstances.   
 
Furthermore, I suggested earlier that the reluctance of governments in many nations to 
accord real rights of self-determination to Indigenous peoples is a reflection of the 
belief (perhaps subliminal) that any intrinsic value which a culture possesses is based 
on the existence and assessment of some external valuer.  Deliberations involving 
Indigenous delegations and representatives of states over the content of the Draft 
Declaration have often become bogged down over whether the right to self-
determination is limited to an internally (within the Indigenous community) exercised 
right or whether it could include a right to secession or separate sovereignty.  
Although Indigenous peoples themselves overwhelmingly rejected the assertion that 
secession would be sought by their communities, they claimed it was an important 
matter of principle that they not be dictated to ahead of time as to how they would 
exercise their autonomy under the declaration.8  If, however, the value of an 
Indigenous community was ultimately to be grounded in how it viewed and valued 
itself (as being at least viable and contiguous), and it was that conception of intrinsic 
value which informed our law and policy making, then this would not only be a 
theoretically coherent jurisprudential position but a significant tool for empowering 
these communities. 
 
How else can Indigenous peoples and communities freely determine their political, 
economic and social futures unless the wider population (and the legislature) allows 
that the value of those cultures is ultimately generated by a process of self-valuation?   
 
To return to the central thesis of this discussion – the law ought to protect that which 
is valuable.  A fundamental flaw in current law and policy making is that the 
presumed value of Indigenous peoples is continually categorised as being their value 
to someone or something external to their own communities or cultures.  Laws which 
seek to protect the rights of Indigenous peoples based on benefits to the wider 
community, or on what the wider community believes is valuable may be well 
intentioned, but are inescapably paternalistic and lacking in credibility.  
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